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1978] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ment made by the employee in the payee's name is effective.01
Thus, if a bank pays on such an instrument it is not liable in conver-
sion since the employer is made to bear the risk of loss."' In
Underpinning, the employee did not merely indorse the instrument
in the payee's name; rather, he restrictively indorsed it. This event,
although sufficient in the court's view to give the drawer a cause of
action against the depositary bank, should not alter the legal result
obtaining from the imposter rule. Since section 3-405 was drafted
with the object of imposing risk of loss upon the drawer,2"3 the
Underpinning result is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters
of the Code.
Bruce A. Antonelli
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE
Declaration against penal interest held inadmissible against
defendant in criminal action
In People v. Brown,"4 the Court of Appeals expanded the decla-
ration against interest exception to include a declaration against
penal interest offered by a defendant in a criminal case.25 The
201 N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964); see notes 174-75 supra.
- N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964). An argument might be made, however, that
even where the imposter rule applies, if a bank acts contrary to reasonable commercial
practices and pays inconsistently with the terms of a restrictive indorsement, the drawer
should be allowed to assert such negligence and shift the loss to the payor bank. Under §§ 3-
406 and 4-406, if both the bank and its customer are shown to have been negligent with respect
to instruments which have been altered or signed without authorization, the resulting loss is
borne by the bank. N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406 (McKinney 1964); see WHrrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 173, at 548-49.
See R. ANDERSON, supra note 174, §§ 3-405:6,-505:3.
26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970).
20 It had been the settled rule in New York that the declaration against interest excep-
tion only included declarations against one's pecuniary or proprietary interest. See, e.g.,
Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 175-76, 155 N.E. 88, 90 (1926); Ellwanger v. Whitefold,
15 App. Div. 2d 898, 898-99, 225 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (lst Dep't 1962) (per curiam), aff'd mem.,
12 N.Y.2d 1037, 190 N.E.2d 24, 239 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1963). See generally W. RICHARDSON,
EVIDENCE §§ 255-266 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973); see also People v. Sullivan, 43 App. Div. 2d
55, 349 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam). Professor Wigmore persuasively urged
American courts to "discard this barbarous doctrine [precluding the admission of declara-
tions against penal interest], which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself
even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the
very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of justice .... " 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1477, at 290 (3d ed. 1940).
In the Brown case, the defendant was on trial for murder and asserted that he had killed
the victim in self-defense. 26 N.Y.2d at 90, 257 N.E.2d at 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Although
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Brown Court did not indicate, however, whether a declaration
against penal interest could be used by the prosecution as part of
its affirmative case."' Since one requirement established by Brown
is that the declarant be unavailable for examination at trial,"' the
admission of such testimony would appear to conflict with the con-
stitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. 0 8 Recently, in People v. Cepeda, "I the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that the sixth amendment right of
confrontation precludes use by the prosecution of a declaration
against penal interest made by an unapprehended co-felon for pur-
Brown alleged that when he fired the victim had a pistol drawn, several witnesses testified
to the contrary and the police found no weapon at the scene of the shooting. Id. Brown's
attorney, however, learned that a third party had admitted to the police "that he had 'picked
up the gun . . . immediately after the shooting,'" and had used the weapon in a robbery.
Id., 257 N.E.2d at 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. This corroborated the defendant's plea of self-
defense. Id. at 90-91, 257 N.E.2d at 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Believing that to exclude this
testimony would be unjust, the Court discarded the traditional rule, citing authority which
would admit such evidence to exonerate a defendant. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States,
228 U.S. 243, 277-78 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874-
75, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964) (en banc); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 1476,
at 283.
2 See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 205, § 260; Note, Declarations Against Penal Inter-
est in New York: Carte Blanche?, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1130-31 (1970).
m 26 N.Y.2d at 93-94, 257 N.E.2d at 18, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 828-29. The Brown Court
established that the requirement of "unavailability" is fulfilled if the declarant is deceased,
beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court or unwilling to testify based on the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 94, 257 N.E.2d at 18-19, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 829. In addition, a declara-
tion against penal interest will only be admissible at trial if the declaration was against the
declarant's penal interest when made, the declarant had competent knowledge of the facts
and there is no probable motive to misrepresent them, the testimony is material, and there
is other evidence establishing the existence of the declarant and connecting him with the
crime. See People v. Riccardi, 73 Misc. 2d 19, 22, 340 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County) (mem.), aff'd mem., 40 App. Div. 2d 1083, 338 N.Y.S.2d 598 (2d Dep't 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973). A declaration against penal interest may also serve as a basis
for probable cause. See People v. Wolzer, 41 App. Div. 2d 679, 681, 340 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956
(3d Dep't 1973) (mei.); People v. Barcia, 37 App. Div. 2d 612, 612, 323 N.Y.S,2d 517, 518
(2d Dep't 1971) (mem.), appeal dismissed mem., 30 N.Y.2d 873, 335 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1972);
People v. Lee, 78 Misc. 2d 1020, 1024, 357 N.Y.S.2d 805, 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1974).
Although Brown involved a criminal case, "it is, of course, obvious that a declaration against
penal interest . . . is admissible as well in civil cases." RicHARDSON, supra note 205, § 260,
at 228. See also CPL § 60.10 (McKinney 1976) (the civil rules of evidence are generally
applicable to criminal proceedings).
n3 See RICHARDSON, supra note 205, § 260. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent
part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (confrontation rights made obligatory on states through
fourteenth amendment). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968)(per curiam); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
"1 61 App. Div. 2d 962, 403 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
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poses of inculpating a defendant in a criminal case. 21 0
Ramon Cepeda was convicted in Supreme Court, Bronx
County, for his participation in a homicide. 21' At the trial, a prosecu-
tion witness testified that shortly after the crime occurred, and in
the company of the defendant, an unapprehended accomplice had
stated: "[W]e just shot a colored guy. ' 21 2 On appeal, the prosecu-
tion argued that the statement was a declaration against penal in-
terest and, under Brown, was properly admitted against the defen-
dant for its truth.213 The first department, however, rejected this
argument, finding that Brown only sanctioned the admission of a
declaration against penal interest on behalf of a criminal defen-
dant.2 4 The court reasoned that had the declarant been on trial with
the defendant and refused to testify, the admission of the testimony
in unredacted form would have been an impermissible infringement
of the defendant's right of confrontation. 21 5 Positing that a defen-
dant's right of confrontation does not depend on whether his co-
felon is being jointly tried, the court held that the admission of the
testimony was error.2 6
11D Id. at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
231 Id. at 962-63, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
212 Id. at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
21' Id.
214 Id.; see note 205 supra. The memorandum opinion expressed the views of Justices
Evans, Lynch, Sander and Sullivan. Presiding Justice Silverman concurred in the result only.
235 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249. The Cepeda majority felt that Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), barred the introduction of a declaration against penal
interest uttered by a co-felon. 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249. Bruton involved
the joint trial of Evans and Bruton for postal robbery. 391 U.S. at 124. At trial, a postal
inspector recounted an oral confession allegedly made by Evans, incriminating himself as well
as Bruton. Id. The trial judge instructed the jury that Evans' confession was inadmissible
against Bruton and should be disregarded in determining his guilt or innocence. Id. at 125.
Both Bruton and Evans were convicted and appealed. Id. at 124 n.1. The eighth circuit
suppressed Evans' confession and reversed his conviction on the basis of Westover v. United
States, decided with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 391 U.S. at 124 n.1. Bruton's
conviction was affirmed, however, on the basis of Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232,
241-43 (1957), wherein it was held that where a codefendant's testimony is inadmissible
against the defendant but is used for other purposes at trial, limiting instructions by the trial
judge sufficiently protect the defendant's rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the govern-
ment urged that Bruton's conviction be reversed "in the interests of justice," and urged that
Delli Paoli be left intact. 391 U.S. at 125-26. Instead, the Bruton Court, in reversing the
conviction, overruled Delli Paoli. The Court held that the admission of the codefendant's
confession violated the defendant's right of confrontation because of the substantial risk that
despite limiting instructions the jury might consider this evidence against the defendant. Id.
The Bruton Court emphasized that the hearsay implicating the defendant was inadmissible
and did not fit within a recognized hearsay exception. Id. at 128 n.3. Dean Prince has restated
the Bruton rule as follows: "A confession by one defendant, who does not testify, that impli-
cates his co-defendant is. . .not admissible on a joint trial, unless the implicating references
can effectively be deleted." RICHARDSON, supra note 205, § 233, at 207.
2,6 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249. The court sustained Cepeda's conviction,
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Presiding Justice Silverman disagreed with the majority and
urged that Brown be given a broad construction to encompass in-
criminating declarations." Justice Silverman argued that the con-
frontation clause does not preclude the introduction of otherwise
admissible hearsay against a defendant in a criminal action.218
however, finding that the admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Under the doctrine of harmless error, a constitutional error requires reversal of a
criminal conviction unless "there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have con-
tributed to Defendant's conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 326 N.E.2d 787, 789, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (1975);
see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
251 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
86-87 (1963); People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 160, 167, 371 N.E.2d 528, 532, 400 N.Y.S.2d 810,
814 (1977); People v. Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 224, 366 N.E.2d 799, 801, 397 N.Y.S. 2d 709,
711 (1977). In addition, the majority rejected the prosecution's contention that the defen-
dant's failure to respond to the remark was an admission by silence. 61 App. Div. 2d at 963,
403 N.Y.S.2d at 249. An admission by silence may be found when a party remains silent in
circumstances where he would naturally be expected to speak. See RIcHRDSON, supra note
205, § 222, at 197. The criteria for admitting such evidence were established in People v.
Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949). The accusation must be "'fully known and fully
understood'" by the party against whom the admission has been offered. Id. at 225, 90 N.E.2d
at 49 (quoting People v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 374, 48 N.E. 730, 736 (1897)). Further, it must
be made at a time when the party was "'at full liberty to make answer thereto, and then
only under such circumstances as would justify the inference of assent or acquiescence as to
the truth of the statement by his remaining silent.' "300 N.Y. at 225, 90 N.E.2d at 49 (quoting
People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 367, 93 N.E. 943, 947-48 (1911)). It is well settled, however,
that since a defendant has no obligation to speak to authorities when under arrest or about
to be arrested, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 360 U.S.
609 (1964), his silence under such circumstances is not an admission. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37;
see People v. Von Werne, 41 N.Y.2d 584, 587-88, 362 N.E.2d 982, 985, 394 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186
(1977); People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 107, 184 N.E. 689, 690 (1933). In criminal cases,
courts are strict in requiring that admission-by-silence evidence fit clearly within the rule.
See RiCHARDSON, supra note 205, § 222, at 197.
217 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (Silverman, J.P., concurring). Justice
Silverman also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the defendant's failure to re-
spond was not an admission by silence. Id. at 964, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Silverman, J.P.,
concurring).
211 Id. (Silverman, J.P., concurring). Justice Silverman cited People v. Harding, 37
N.Y.2d 130, 135, 332 N.E.2d 354, 357, 371 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497 (1975) (Cooke, J., concurring),
as authority for the proposition that declaration against penal interest testimony is admissi-
ble to incriminate. 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50. Harding involved the use
at a criminal trial of a deceased declarant's prior testimony given before an administrative
panel. This testimony was not admissible as "former testimony" under CPL § 670.10 since
it did not fall within one of the enumerated categories in the statute. 37 N.Y.2d at 134, 332
N.E.2d at 356, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 496. Judge Cooke, joined by Chief Judge Breitel and Judge
Jasen, urged that the record made at the administrative hearing was admissible against the
defendant as a declaration against penal interest. Id. at 135, 332 N.E.2d at 357, 371 N.Y.S.2d
at 497 (Cooke, J., concurring). Nevertheless, it is submitted that Judge Cooke's concurring
opinion provides no support for Justice Silverman's position that such hearsay is admissible
irrespective of a defendant's right of confrontation. The declarant in Harding "was subjected,
under oath, to extensive cross-examination at the hearing by defendant and later by his
attorney." Id. at 137, 332 N.E.2d at 358-59, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (Cooke, J., concurring).
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While the Cepeda court correctly recognized that nothing in
Brown suggests that declarations against penal interest testimony
should be admitted to incriminate, its interpretation of the confron-
tation clause appears overbroad. Generally, defendants are entitled
to confront the declarant of hearsay as well as the witness. 29 Occa-
sionally, however, the trier of fact has been permitted to consider
incriminating hearsay of great probative value where the declarant
is unavailable for cross-examination. 20 While the Supreme Court
has not spoken with clarity on the relationship between hearsay
rules of evidence and the right of confrontation, the distinction be-
tween the two should not be blurred.21' If the prosecution can show
a high level of reliability, 22 justifying the admission of a declaration
against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, it is
submitted that a defendant's right of confrontation may be satisfied
by cross-examination of the witness alone.2 23 Only when the intro-
Judge Cooke acknowledged this in concluding that the testimony's admission at trial "would
not be precluded by the confrontation clause . . . ." Id. (Cooke, J., concurring). Justice
Silverman noted that the Supreme Court, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), had
found that the right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of an extrajudicial
statement by an accomplice which fit within a statutory hearsay exception. 61 App. Div. 2d
at 964, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Silverman, J.P., concurring).
"I9 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
211 In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court noted that the admission of certain
types of hearsay is not prohibited by the confrontation clause. Id. at 407; see, e.g., Delaney
v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924) (statements of deceased co-conspirator); Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (former testimony); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (dying declarations). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
107 (1934); People v. Corey, 157 N.Y. 332, 347-48, 51 N.E. 1024, 1028-29 (1898).
211 As the Supreme Court noted in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the confron-
tation clause is not a codification of hearsay rules as they existed at common law. Id. at 155.
Various forms of hearsay may be deemed admissible, while others are held to violate the sixth
amendment. Id. at 155-56.
2 Indicia of reliability are entirely lacking, for example, if the declaration is made to a
police officer after arrest. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); People v. Coble, 65 Cal. App. 3d 187, 192, 135 Cal. Rptr. 199, 202 (1976); People v.
Shipe, 49 Cal. App. 3d 343, 353, 122 Cal. Rptr. 701, 708 (1975).
z1 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). The Dutton Court was faced with
a challenge to the Georgia statutory co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 78.
The statute provided that declarations made after the culmination of the charged conspiracy
were admissible as evidence-in-chief against all co-conspirators on the theory that there
existed a continuing conspiracy to conceal the crime charged. Id. The fifth circuit had re-
versed Evans' conviction on the ground that the introduction of post-conspiracy declarations
made by Evans' codefendant violated the strictures of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); see 400 F.2d at 827. See also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946). The
Dutton Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld the statutory scheme. 400 U.S. at 87-88 (Stewart,
J.) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun joined in the judgment); see note
224 infra. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, stated that a sixth amendment analysis
was inappropriate. 400 U.S. at 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan felt that the
rules of evidence would be better weighed against a due process standard of fairness. Id. at
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:594
duction of such evidence is unfairly prejudicial should the trial
courts exercise their discretion and exclude it.
The confrontation clause has long been held not to bar the
introduction of reliable hearsay.24 Since the Brown court deter-
mined that under the rules of evidence declaration against penal
interest testimony is sufficiently reliable so as to permit its use by
a defendant, there appears to be no constitutional bar to permitting
its use by the prosecution.
Ralph J. Libsohn
Press held accountable in punitive damages for trespass
The first amendment's prohibition on abridging the freedom of
the pressm is grounded in the belief that a free society needs an
97 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan,
dissented. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that "[absent the
opportunity for cross-examination [of the declarant], testimony about [an] incriminating
and implicating statement allegedly made by [an accomplice is] constitutionally inadmissi-
ble .. " Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), as controlling. 400 U.S. at 103. Bruton, however, concerned use
of inadmissible hearsay against the defendant which did not fall within any recognized
hearsay exception. 61 App. Div. 2d at 963, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Silverman, J.P., concurring);
see note 215 supra. It appears, therefore, that Bruton is distinguishable from both Dutton
and Cepeda.
The statutory rule at issue in Dutton contrasts with New York law which holds that
although admissions by a co-conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy are admissible against
all co-conspirators, admissions made after the culmination of the common plan are admissi-
ble only against the declarant. RICHARDSON, supra note 205, § 244, at 214-15. See also Daven-
port, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions:
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1378 (1972).
22 See note 220 supra. This is the teaching of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970),
wherein the Court held that indicia of reliability were required for the introduction of incrimi-
nating hearsay testimony. Id. at 88-89. The Court noted that such indicia are present if: (1)
the declarant's personal knowledge of the facts contained in the declaration is "abundantly
established"; (2) there is little possibility that the statement is the product of a faulty
recollection; (3) the circumstances indicate that the declarant has not misrepresented the
involvement of the defendant; and (4) the statement appears spontaneous and against the
penal interest of the declarant. Id. Whether the statement in Dutton was against the declar-
ant's penal interest is questionable. Evans' codefendant made the declaration at issue upon
his return to prison after his arraignment on a murder charge. Id. at 77. He was asked by a
fellow inmate; "'How did you make out in court?'" Id. The declarant responded: "'If it
hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now.' "Id. The
self-incriminating aspect of this statement is unclear, as it appears likely that the declarant
was attempting to shift the blame to Evans. One commentator has questioned the preceden-
tial value of Dutton in light of its plurality opinion. See Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay:
A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFsTA L. Rav. 32 (1973).
The first amendment of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The freedoms of the first amendment are protected from state action through the
